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INTRODUCTION
Over a century after its publication, Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel, The Jungle, remains one of the
most impactful pieces of investigative literature ever published. 1 During 1904, in an effort to expose the
heinous working conditions of Chicago’s meat packing industry, Sinclair went under disguise as a factory
worker for seven weeks.2 While Sinclair’s purpose for The Jungle was to propel federal reform against
inhumane work conditions, it was the first-hand depiction of the callous slaughtering and unsanitary
processing of meat products which led to national uproar.3 Gaining the attention of national political leaders,
including President Theodore Roosevelt, The Jungle influenced Congress to pass The Meat Inspection Act
of 1906.4
Sinclair’s “guerilla” journalism method has influenced generations of social activists and more
animal protection groups are turning to undercover video investigations to expose criminal and inhumane
practices on factory farms that would otherwise go unnoticed by the public.5 With the help of modern
technological advances in recording devices, undercover investigations of animal facilities play a crucial
role in building evidence necessary to assist law enforcement in criminally prosecuting the illegal handling
of animals and animal products and issuing food recalls that potentially save millions from illnesses.6

1

Robert W. Cherry, The Jungle and the Progressive Era, THE GILDER LEHRMAN INSTITUTE OF AMERICAN
HISTORY, http://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/politics-reform/essays/jungle-and-progressive-era (last
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (“The jungle produced an immediate and powerful effect on Americans and on federal
policy”).
2
Chris Bachelder, The Jungle at 100, MOTHER JONES (Jan./Feb. 2006),
http://www.motherjones.com/media/2006/01/jungle-100.
3
Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle SchoolTube (published Sept. 18, 2013),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xxe9nosWawM.
4
Biography of Upton Sinclair, GRADE SAVER, http://www.gradesaver.com/author/upton-sinclair (last visited Aug.
30, 2015). See also Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle SchoolTube, supra note 3 at 4:28 (“Americans were outraged and
they urged the United States Congress to pass the Meat Inspection Act of 1906. More federal laws followed that
prevented packers from adding fillers and impurities to meat and the United States Department of Agriculture
inspectors were put in every meat plant in the country.”)
5
Nathan Runkle, Undercover Videos Critical to Exposing Abuse: Column, USA TODAY (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/08/13/undercover-videos-exposing-abuse-column/31208801/
(“Without undercover investigations, sadistic and often criminal acts of animal cruelty on factory farms would go
undetected, unaddressed, and unpunished as would major threats to public health and the environment.”)
6
Jennifer Molido, Undercover Investigations Help Protect Farmed Animals, ANIMAL LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (Mar.
31, 2015), http://aldf.org/blog/undercover-investigations-help-protect-farmed-animals/.
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With nothing more than a pen and pad, Sinclair was able to drive federal reform in meat production
that benefited human health and welfare.7 Sadly, however, this type of activism is now being criminalized
throughout the United States.8 “Ag-Gag” laws, a term first coined by New York Times food journalist Mark
Bittman in 2011,9 are laws currently valid in six states10 which criminalize acts related to undercover
investigations of daily agricultural activities.11 Ag-Gag laws are far reaching, criminalizing not only the
entrance of animal facilities for the purpose of obtaining evidence of animal cruelty, but even the mere
possession and distribution of unauthorized media recorded on animal facilities.12
While the United States Constitution bars federal and state laws which abridge the freedom of
speech,13 Ag-Gag laws not only have the purpose and effect of chilling free speech, but they also impede
the public enlightenment of critical social issues including animal welfare, food safety, workers’ rights, and
environmental safety.14 The purpose of this article is to investigate and analyze various legal frameworks
to attack Ag-Gag laws on multiple fronts. Part I provides a history and overview of Ag-Gag legislation and
its implementation. Part II evaluates Ag-Gag laws in the context of First Amendment freedom of speech
jurisprudence and addresses why these content-based restrictions on protected free speech must be deemed
unconstitutional. Part III explores the potential application of anti-SLAPP laws to deter lawsuits brought
under civil-liability provisions of Ag-Gag laws through early dismissal and recovery of litigation fees.

7

Cherry, supra note 1.
Ag-Gag Whistleblower Suppression Legislation, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacycenter/Ag-Gag-whistleblower-suppression-legislation (last visited Sept. 1. 2015).
9
Mark Bittman, Who Protects the Animals? (Apr. 26, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/26/whoprotects-the-animals/?_r=1.
10
Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/animal-protection/public-policy/ag-gaglegislation-state (last visited Nov. 19, 2015).
11
Ag-Gag Whistleblower Suppression Legislation, supra note 8 (while there are currently seven states with active
Ag-Gag statutes, the U.S. District Court in Idaho recently ruled the Idaho law unconstitutional. See Animal Legal
Defense Fund v. Otter, 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015)).
12
Why Ag-Gag Laws are Dangerous, ASPCA, https://www.aspca.org/fight-cruelty/advocacy-center/Ag-Gagwhistleblower-suppression-legislation/why-Ag-Gag-laws-are (last visited Sept. 1, 2015).
13
U.S. CONST. amends. I and XIV.
14
Why Ag-Gag Laws are Dangerous, supra note 12.
8
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I. HISTORY OF AG-GAG LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. HISTORY OF AG-GAG LAWS
In the late 1980’s, direct action campaigns—often endorsing such extreme measures as animal
liberation—championed a new, more directly-active animal rights movement to the mass public.15 Not
unlike acts committed during the American Civil Rights era of the 1960’s,16 animal activist groups propelled
cases of animal abuse to the national spotlight through social protest and a “Rambo-raid” style animal
liberation.17 Through this heightened activism, animal activist groups discovered shocking revelations
regarding the animal production industry.18
The agricultural industry has been referred to as the “backbone of our economy”19 with the beef
and poultry industry generating $119 billion annually within the United States.20 Consequently, animal
activists pose one of the largest threats to that industry.21 In an attempt to regulate this perceived nuisance,
in the early 1990’s, Kansas, Montana, and North Dakota were the first states to enact statutes providing
increased protections to the agricultural and livestock industry, creating advance criminal trespass penalties
against those who enter facilities for the purpose of exposing inhumanities.22

15

Justin F. Marceau, Ag Gag Past, Present, and Future, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1317, 1319 (2015).
Clayborne Carson & David Malcom Carson, Black Panther Party, STANFORD UNIV.,
http://web.stanford.edu/~ccarson/articles/am_left.htm (last visited Sep. 20, 2015) (describing criminal activities the
Black Panthers social group committed for the purpose of advancing the civil rights movement).
17
Marceau, supra note 15, at 1320.
18
Laura G. Kniaz, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad, 43 BUFF. L. REV.
765, 766-73 (1995) (“Every year, humans kill billions of animals for food, clothing, entertainment, and research.
More than four billion cows, steer, sheep, lambs, pigs, chickens and turkeys are raised and slaughtered annually to
satisfy Americans' appetite for meat, dairy, and eggs. Between ten and one hundred million animals are killed yearly
in United States laboratories.”).
19
Brian Pivik, Agriculture – the Backbone of the US Economy, PETERSONS, (June 17, 2015),
https://www.petersons.com/online-schools/agriculture-degree-online.aspx.
20
Stephanie Armour, ‘Industrial Terrorism’ of Undercover Livestock Videos Targeted, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, (Feb. 21, 2012), http://www.ellinghuysen.com/news/articles/129669.shtml.
21
Susie Cagle, Two Views on Ag-Gag: The Investigator and the Farm Advocate, GRIST, (Apr. 25, 2013),
http://grist.org/food/two-views-on-Ag-Gags/ (“A 2010 Kansas State University study found that, ‘[a]s a whole,
media attention to animal welfare has significant, negative effects on U.S. meat demand’”).
22
Daniel L. Sternberg, Why Can't I Know How the Sausage Is Made?: How Ag-Gag Statutes Threaten Animal
Welfare Groups and the First Amendment, 13 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 625, 628 (2015).
16
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Between 1991 and 2011, no new Ag-Gag legislation was passed.23 However, since 2012, a new
wave of Ag-Gag legislation, even more restrictive than its predecessors, emerged on the house floor in more
than half of the states in the country.24 Missouri, Idaho, Utah, and Iowa have implemented their own
versions of these laws that, while marginally different, all have the same effect of criminalizing the process
of gathering undercover information and reporting of animal industries.25 Additionally, more states are
following suit with an Ag-Gag law taking effect in North Carolina in 2016.26

B. TYPES OF AG-GAG LAWS AND THEIR IMPLEMENTATION
Boiled down, Ag-Gag laws are penalties imposed on investigators who go undercover in animal
facilities for the purpose of exposing animal abuse.27 There are two different types of Ag-Gag laws:
restrictions on the act of recordings animal facilities and restrictions on the collection of animal abuse
videos.28 The first type of Ag-Gag laws, which were implemented in Kansas, Montana, Utah, Idaho, Iowa,
and North Dakota, criminalize the unauthorized entry of an agricultural or animal facility with the intent to
damage the enterprise.29 Some Ag-Gag laws also criminalize the act of providing false information on
employment applications for the purpose of gaining entry into agricultural facilities.30 Those who violate
these laws may face up to one year in jail,31 $5000 in fines,32 and even civil liability for three times the
actual and consequential damages caused to the facility by the recording.33

23

Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, supra note 10.
Id. (since 2012, Ag-Gag laws were introduced, and have failed in, nineteen different states, including Florida).
25
Id.
26
Dan Flynn, North Carolina’s Civil ‘Ag-Gag’ Law Getting National Attention, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, (June 9,
2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/06/north-carolinas-civil-Ag-Gag-law-getting-nationalattention/#.VkvGMHarS02.
27
Matthew Shea, Punishing Animal Rights Activists for Animal Abuse: Rapid Reporting and the New Wave of AgGag Laws, 48 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 337, 338 (2015).
28
Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, supra note 10.
29
Id.
30
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(2)(b)-(c) (West 2015); See also IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(1)(c) (West
2015).
31
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827 (West 2015); See also UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112(3) (West 2015); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-7042(3) (West 2015).
32
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042(3) (West 2015).
33
See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1828 (West 2015). See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-30-104 (West 2015); N.D. CENT.
CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-05 (West 2015).
24
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The second type of Ag-Gag law, Missouri Statute 578.013.1, in what appears to be an attempt to
make Ag-Gag laws more palatable, requires all recordings believed to depict animal abuse or neglect,
including recordings made of factory farms, to be turned over to law enforcement within twenty-four hours
of the recording.34 Violation of these so-called “quick reporting” statutes is punishable by up to one year in
jail and a fine of up to $5000.35 While advocates of this law hold that it promotes animal welfare, its intent
and effect is to prohibit individuals from gathering evidence of patterns of abuse, which is often necessary
for states to prosecute under animal cruelty statutes.36
Unfortunately, Ag-Gag laws are a problem that continues to grow at both a domestic and
international level.37 North Carolina’s new Property Protection Act,38 which was passed over Governor Pat
McCrory’s veto, imposes steep civil penalties for “interference with property,” which is defined vaguely.39
Animal activists are worried that this law, although not a traditional Ag-Gag law in the sense that it does
not impose criminal penalties, will have the effect of chilling speech and deterring employees or
investigators from recording and reporting animal abuse.40 Similarly, in Australia, a new amendment to
Australia’s criminal code was introduced by Western Australian Liberal Senator, Chris Back, creating a
hybrid between the two types of Ag-Gag laws in that it criminalizes the act of purposely interfering with
an animal enterprise—which includes undercover recordings—while also requiring recordings of animal
abuse to be turned over to the proper authorities within five business days.41
Aside from being an unconstitutional restriction on free speech (which will be discussed further
infra), Ag-Gag laws restrict the flow of critical information addressing agricultural activates that can affect
public health, labor, and animal abuse concerns.42 Modern Ag-Gag laws are modeled after the Animal
34

MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013(1) (West 2015).
MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013(3).
36
Marceau, supra note 15, at 1341.
37
See Flynn, supra note 26; 5 Reasons to Fear Ag-Gag, VOICELESS: THE ANIMAL PROTECTION INSTITUTE, (Feb. 13,
2015), https://www.voiceless.org.au/content/5-reasons-fear-Ag-Gag.
38
2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 2015-50.
39
Flynn, supra note 26.
40
Id.
41
5 Reasons to Fear Ag-Gag, supra note 37.
42
Dayton Martindale, Ag-Gag Laws: The Less You Know The Better, IN THESE TIMES, (June 19, 2015),
http://inthesetimes.com/rural-america/entry/18071/Ag-Gag-laws-what-you-dont-know-might-hurt-you.
35
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Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA),43 a federal law designed to protect animal enterprises from interference
by activists.44 However, even though both AETA and Ag-Gag laws are severely overbroad, what
differentiates AETA from current Ag-Gag legislation is a “savings clause” which recognizes that the law
should not apply toward “activities protected by free speech or free exercise clauses of the First Amendment
to the Constitution, regardless of the point of view expressed.”45 Ag-Gag laws not only fail to include a
similar savings clause, but expressly prohibit recordings made for the purpose of harming the reputation of
the animal facility.46
While supporters of Ag-Gag laws deemed them necessary to protect agricultural facilities from socalled “animal terrorists,”47 prosecution of these laws has been rare, with only two reported incidents of
enforcement of an Ag-Gag law nationally.48 Additionally, the State Attorney dropped both charges.49

II.

AG-GAG LAWS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY RESTRICT FREE SPEECH
Under the United States Constitution, Americans are to be free from laws that abridge the freedom

of speech.50 Laws that are designed for the purpose of restricting expression contradict basic principles of

43

18 U.S.C. § 43 (West 2015).
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA), CIVIL LIBERTIES DEFENSE CENTER, http://cldc.org/organizingresources/animal-enterprise-terrorism-act-aeta/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2015).
45
18 U.S.C. § 43(e)(2) (2006).
46
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 47-1827(c)(4) (West 2008) (“No person shall, without the effective consent of the owner and
with the intent to damage the enterprise conducted at the animal facility: enter an animal facility to take pictures by
photograph, video camera or by any other means.” (emphasis added)).
47
Armour, supra note 20 (explaining that the author of Iowa’s Ag-Gag law refers to undercover investigative
activities as “industrial terrorism.”); See also Alexi Howk, What It’s Like To Be Detained And Prosecuted Under
Ag-Gag Law, THE DODO (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.thedodo.com/what-its-like-to-be-detained-a-776800493.html
(“Sen. David Hinkins, R-Orangeville . . . referred to ‘vegetarian groups’ who ‘are trying to kill the animal industry’
as ‘terrorists,’ according to court documents”).
48
Will Potter, BREAKING: 4 People Prosecuted Under #AgGag Law for Photographing Factory Farm From the
Road, GREEN IS THE NEW RED (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.greenisthenewred.com/blog/Ag-Gag-case-utah-circlefour-farms/8073/.
49
Dan Flynn, Utah Prosecutor Drops ‘Ag-Gag’ Charges Against Vegan Activists, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Jan. 13,
2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/01/charges-against-four-vegan-activists-under-utah-Ag-Gagdropped/#.VkvCK3arS01 (ironically, in the second instance, even though the charges under Utah’s Ag-Gag law
were dropped against the defendants, the state proceeded with criminal trespass charges, which is a less restrictive
means than Ag-Gag laws when it comes to abridging free speech).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
44
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the First Amendment.51 The purpose of the First Amendment is to promote necessary values, including the
advancement of knowledge, individual self-realization, the discovery of truth, and public participation from
all members of society.52 Accordingly, the “marketplace of ideas” theory cannot be realized with
unscrutinized governmental censorship of individual perspective.53
With restrictions on the gathering of evidence of animal abuse or impractical deadlines to submit
such evidence to proper authorities, Ag-Gag laws discriminate against an individual’s constitutional right
to investigate and uncover animal cruelty. Ag-Gag laws vary, but all have either the purpose or effect of
chilling one specific type of speech: speech detrimental to the agricultural industry. Laws like Iowa’s AgGag law have the purpose of chilling free speech as it criminalizes the entry of animal facilities with the
intention to record abuse and disrupt the facility’s practices.54 Similarly, laws like Missouri’s Ag-Gag law
have the effect of chilling speech by placing an impractical twenty-four hour deadline to turn in videotapes
believed to depict animal abuse.55
This section will first analyze how Ag-Gag laws restrict forms of protected speech. After
reviewing content-based jurisprudence and making a determination Ag-Gag laws are content-based, it will
then analyze why these laws cannot survive strict scrutiny. Finally, a second facial challenge to these laws
will be addressed to demonstrate why they are unconstitutionally overbroad.

A. FREE SPEECH ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
1. Protected Speech

51

U.S. v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812 (2000).
Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 591 (1982).
53
Id.
54
IOWA CODE ANN. § 717A.2 (West 2013 & Supp. 2015).
55
MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.013(1) (West Supp. 2016); See also Marceau, supra note 15, at 1340-41 (explaining how
quick-reporting statutes have the effect of impeding journalistic and undercover investigation of animal facilities as
(1) there is no evidence that these laws confer a concrete benefit to animals; and (2) the law makes it impossible to
show patterns of systematic abuse).
52
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The first threshold inquiry that must be made when analyzing whether a law violates the First
Amendment right to free speech is determining whether the restricted speech or conduct is protected.56 In
order for Ag-Gag laws to violate free speech, the act of providing false information on employment
applications and gathering information by recording on agricultural facilities must be a form of protected
speech.
While forms of unprotected speech do exist, the Supreme Court has applied a very liberal view on
what constitutes protected speech.57 Even material that “many adults themselves would find . . . highly
offensive” warrant First Amendment protection.58 Categories of unprotected speech include obscenity,
defamation, or speech having the ability to incite imminent lawless action, but have been held to be “welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech.”59 Hence, the general rule that must be followed is that the
First Amendment protects against governmental restrictions on expression based on “its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content.”60
Under current Ag-Gag legislation, there are generally two forms of protected speech being
abridged: the false statements made by the investigator that are necessary to gain entry into animal facilities
and the actual recording within the facility.61 Both forms of speech have been determined by the Supreme
Court to constitute protected speech.62
In United States v. Alvarez,63 the defendant, a habitual liar, was indicted under the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005 for fabricating a story about earning a Congressional Medal of Honor.64 After the defendant
challenged the act for unconstitutionally abridging his First Amendment right to freedom of expression, the

56

Russell W. Galloway, Basic Free Speech Analysis, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 883, 892 (1991).
Id. at 893-94.
58
Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 811.
59
U.S. v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468-69 (2010).
60
Id. at 468.
61
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-112 (West 2015) (criminalizing submission of false information on employment
applications with the intent to enter agricultural facilities to record); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-21.1-02(6) (West
2015) (criminalizing the use or video records in an animal facility without the consent of the owner).
62
See U.S. v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012) (holding false statements may be protected under the First
Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (holding non-verbal expression is protected speech under
the First Amendment).
63
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2542.
64
Id.
57
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plaintiff argued that false statements warrant no First Amendment protections.65 The Supreme Court held
while there are limitations as to liability in tort actions for false statements (i.e. in defamation and fraud
civil actions), this general rule does not exist.66 There is no “broad[] proposition that false statements are
unprotected when made to any person, at any time, in any context” and, generally, false representations are
only unprotected when it infringes on the integrity of governmental processes.67
The Alvarez Court reasoned “false statements are inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous
expression of views in public and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to
guarantee.”68 Similarly, applying this reasoning to Ag-Gag laws, fabricated information submitted on
employment applications by investigators may be necessary and inevitable in the fight against animal
cruelty. Indeed, undercover investigations are one of the more effective methods of uncovering animal
cruelty, and without gaining physical entrance to animal facilities, the information able to be gathered is
severely limited.69
This is not to say that all false statements are protected speech under the First Amendment. The
Supreme Court has concluded that certain false statements do not enjoy constitutional protection.70 While
the State in Alvarez argued the subject law’s purpose was to regulate fraudulent speech, which reduces the
level of scrutiny under which the law is reviewed, Justices Breyer and Kagan’s concurrence rejects this
assertion, reasoning that proof of specific harm was required for a statute that criminalizes false
statements.71 Failing to prove the required causal link between the speech being abridged and the specific
harm resulting from such speech, the Stolen Valor Act could not be considered a fraud statute.72 Therefore,

65

Id.
Id. at 2545-46.
67
Id. at 2546.
68
Id. at 2544 (citing to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (quotation omitted)).
69
Runkle, supra note 5.
70
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-73 (1979) (holding defamatory statements made with actual malice are not
protected under the First Amendment); See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (holding
untruthful commercial speech is not protected under the First Amendment for its own sake); Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964) (holding intentional or reckless false statements made about a public official do not enjoy
constitutional protection).
71
Larissa U. Liebmann, Fraud and First Amendment Protections of False Speech: How United States v.
Alvarez Impacts Constitutional Challenges to Ag-Gag Laws, 31 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 566, 575-76, 78 (2014).
72
Id. at 578.
66
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as Alvarez illustrates, there is no hard-and-fast rule that all false statements are unprotected.73 Accordingly,
false statements should be presumed protected speech unless falling within the scope of a tort action where
the false statement is the relevant issue and causes a legally cognitive harm. Investigators making false
statements to employers to gain entry into their facilities would not fall within this scope.74 Moreover, AgGag laws cannot reasonably be defined as a fraud statute as the statutes fail to express a specific harm
caused by, or a causal link between, an investigator’s false statements to a factory owner to gain entry onto
the land and a subsequent harm to the business.
The second form of speech being infringed by Ag-Gag laws—the act of recording—has been
consistently determined to be a form of expression that is protected under the First Amendment.75
Therefore, the more compelling argument proponents of Ag-Gag statutes may have is that the act of
recording loses its First Amendment protections when done on private property without consent of the
owner. While that proposition is generally found to be true, Ag-Gag laws are so overbroad that even
recording animal facilities on public property may be considered a violation.76 Moreover, a state is
forbidden to enact a content-based restrictions on speech regardless of whether that category of speech
being restricted has been historically categorized as unprotected.77

73

Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2546.
For example, in a successful defamation claim, the first element a plaintiff must prove is that a false and
defamatory statement was made about the plaintiff by the defendant. New York Times Co., 376 U.S. at 258-59.
Here, an investigator makes a false statement about himself in order to gain entry into the facility, thereby failing the
first element of defamation.
75
See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (“we have long recognized that its protection does not end at the spoken or written
word. . .[and] have acknowledged that conduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall
within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” (citation omitted)); Smith v. City of Cumming, 212
F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000) (“The First Amendment protects the right to gather information . . . and
specifically, a right to record matters of public interest.”); Cf., e.g., Gericke v. Begin, 753 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2014)
(holding defendant had the right to film police during a traffic stop).
76
Potter, supra note 48 (In 2013, Amy Meyer was charged with violating Utah’s Ag-Gag law for filming a sick cow
being pushed by a bulldozer while on a public road).
77
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377, 384-85 (1992) (holding an ordinance meant to restrict “fighting
words,”—which is a category of unprotected speech—to be unconstitutional as a State may not impose restrictions
on speech, whether protected or unprotected, when the regulation is based on hostility or favoritism towards the nonproscribed message they contain.).
74
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Finally, public policy further strengthens the proposition that the recording of animal abuse is a
form of protected free speech as the laws of America have prohibited animal cruelty since the 1600’s.78
Accordingly, the forms of speech being restricted by Ag-Gag laws are protected under First Amendment
jurisprudence. The next step is to determine the types of restrictions at issue in these laws in order to apply
the proper level of scrutiny.

2. Content-Based Restrictions and Strict Scrutiny Analysis
After determining that the conduct being suppressed by Ag-Gag laws constitutes forms of protected
speech, the next inquiry is whether Ag-Gag laws are content-based.79 If so, the law must pass the strict
scrutiny test: demonstrating the law is narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest.80 The
alternative would be to conclude the laws are content-neutral, in which case a state may apply reasonable
time, place, and manner restrictions on protected speech so long as the law is narrowly tailored to serve a
substantial governmental interest.81 However, as discussed infra, Ag-Gag laws are clearly content-based
and, therefore, a content-neutral analysis will not be necessary.
Laws are considered content-based restrictions on speech when they “prohibit the public discussion
of an entire topic.”82 In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,83 the Supreme Court tackled
the constitutionality of a law requiring cable providers to alter their television feed of sexually explicit
material.84 Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required cable providers to limit the
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Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469 (citing The Body of Liberties § 92 (Mass. Bay Colony 1641), reprinted in American
Historical Documents 1000–1904, 43 Harvard Classics 66, 79 (C. Eliot ed. 1910) (“No man shall exercise any
Tirranny or Crueltie towards any bruite Creature which are usuallie kept for man's use.”)).
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Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (“Government regulation of speech is content based
if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed (citations
omitted)).
80
Id. at 2226 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—are
presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests.”); See also Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (“the Constitution ‘demands that contentbased restrictions on speech be presumed invalid ... and that the Government bear the burden of showing their
constitutionality.’” (quoting Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 660 (2004)).
81
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791-92 (1989).
82
Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312, 319, 321 (1988) (citation omitted) (holding a law is content-based when the law can
be justified only by reference to the content of the speech being restricted).
83
Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 803.
84
Id. at 806.
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transmission of channels “primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming” between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m., when children are likely not watching.85 At all other times the channel transmission was to be fully
scrambled or blocked.86 As one of the world’s most prominent adult entertainment providers, Playboy
challenged § 505 stating the law was a content-based restriction on free speech and therefore violated the
First Amendment.87
Section 505 was created to address a “signal bleed” trend in contemporary television censorship,
where channel scrambling technology already in place would emit discernible pictures or clear audio
portions on scrambled screens from time to time.88 With an economical advantage to simply block adult
content between the waking hours of children rather than purchasing technologically advanced signal
scramblers, a majority of cable providers choose the former to comply with the new law.89
The Supreme Court determined that § 505 was indeed a content-based restriction on speech as the
statute applied only to channels primarily dedicated to “sexually explicit adult programming or other
programming that is indecent” while leaving signal bleed on all other channels unaddressed.90 Section 505
“focuses only on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners.”91 Similarly,
Ag-Gag laws are content-based restrictions because of the implementation of a scienter to the act of
recording. While a statute forbidding recording on private property alone may be deemed content-neutral
because it would affect all recordings, Ag-Gag laws focus on recordings that “damage the enterprise
conducted at the animal facility.”92 Like § 505 in Playboy was found to be content-based because a
restriction was placed on adult content only, Ag-Gag laws are content-based because they apply to
recordings dedicated to hurt the business of animal facility only. Ag-Gag laws are unconcerned with
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Id.
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Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S at 811.
91
Id. (quoting Boos, 485 U.S. at 321).
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recordings that may help the facility and only focus on recordings that will bring negative publicity, making
the law content-based.
In Playboy, once it was determined that § 505 was a content-based law, the Court analyzed whether
the law was narrowly tailored to promote a compelling governmental interest, which the Court answered in
the negative.93 If a less restrictive alternative would serve the government’s purpose, that alternative must
be used.94 While protecting families from unwanted adult content bleeding through cable signals is a
compelling governmental interest, the means taken to promote that goal—blocking all adult content
between “waking hours”—was not narrowly tailored as less restrictive methods to achieve the goal were
available.95 That method was § 504 of the same law, which allowed subscribers, upon request, to block the
adult channels in their household altogether.96
Similarly, Ag-Gag laws would fail to survive strict scrutiny as the laws are not narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling governmental interest. Proponents of the law may argue that protecting the
profitability of agricultural industry, one of the largest industries in the country, is a compelling interest.
However, Ag-Gag laws are not narrowly tailored as protections against trespassers already exist in codified,
trespass laws.97 Just like Playboy, where a less restrictive alternative to § 505 was found in another law
addressing the subject conduct, trespass and defamation statutes are a less restrictive alternative to Ag-Gag
laws as they protect against the conduct targeted by these laws.98 Furthermore, courts have held the privacy
interest of animal facilities, in itself, was only an important interest, not rising to the level of compelling.99
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Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. at 813.
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Id. at 815.
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Ag-Gag Bills at the State Level, supra note 10 (each State listed with current Ag-Gag laws have criminal trespass
laws codified).
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See also, e.g., Brown v. Ent. Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2739-40 (2011) (holding a content-based
California law placing restrictions on the sale of violent video games to minors fails strict scrutiny because the law
was underinclusive and the video-game industry already had in place a rating system informing buyers of the
content of the games, accomplishing the purpose of the law to a large extent); 44 Liquormart Inc. v. R.I., 517 U.S.
484, 506-08 (1996) (holding a content-based Rhode Island law prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices for the
purpose of maintain higher prices to deter alcohol consumption fails strict scrutiny because less restrictive means are
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Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Otter, 1:14-cv-00104-BLW, 2015 WL 4623943 at 10 (D. Idaho Aug. 3, 2015).
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Therefore, not only do Ag-Gag laws not serve a compelling governmental interest, but they are not narrowly
tailored.
When a law, on its face, draws a distinction as to what type of message is being regulated, the law
is content-based.100 However, even if a law is considered facially content-neutral, it will be considered
content-based if its purpose cannot be “‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,’”
or that it was adopted by the government “because of disagreement with the message [the speech]
conveys.”101 In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Supreme Court held a local sign code was facially contentbased as it subjected ideological, political, and directional signs to specific size, duration, and location
restrictions.102 The Court was not persuaded by the State’s argument that its intent, as shown through the
legislative history, was not to regulate specific speech but all signs in general. 103
While Ag-Gag laws are facially content-based, some proponents of these laws have asserted that
the laws are content neutral and therefore should be subject to lesser scrutiny.104 If faced with this argument,
a court should look to the ruling in Reed and determine that the law should be considered content-based.
Ag-Gag laws cannot be evaluated without reference to the animal abuse videos created by investigators.
The purpose of the law is to regulate the amount of videos created due to the detrimental impact the videos
may have on the industry. While the legislative intent of some Ag-Gag laws may show a content-neutral
purpose of the law,105 a court should not be swayed by the intent and focus on the actual content-based
language of the law, regardless of its intent.
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Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227.
Id. (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. at 791).
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Id. at 2227-28.
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Id. at 2228 (“an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-based law into one that is content
neutral”).
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Otter, 2015 WL 4623943 at 7 (in a challenge to Idaho’s Ag-Gag law, the state argued the law was content-neutral
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Lewis Bollard, The Terrible Price of Ag-Gag Laws, N. Y. DAILY NEWS (May 17, 2013),
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3. Overbreadth
An alternative facial challenge may be used to invalidate Ag-Gag laws.106 Under the First
Amendment, a law may be deemed unconstitutionally overbroad if a “substantial number of its applications
are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.”107 “A statute may appear
to do more good than harm in its total impact and nonetheless reach privileged conduct,” and therefore will
be invalidated.108 Courts have routinely focused on the need for laws to be narrowly tailored to avoid
infringing on protected speech.109
In United States v. Stevens,110 the defendant challenged a law criminalizing the creation, sale, or
possession of media depicting animal cruelty.111 The primary focus of the legislature in enacting the law
was to stop “crush videos,” which feature the torturing and killing of animals for sexual gratification.112
After refusing to extend a class of unprotected speech to animal cruelty videos, the Supreme Court focused
its analysis on whether the law was unconstitutionally overbroad.113 The Court held the law created
sweeping prohibitions on not just crush videos, but all killing of animals.114 “Those seeking to comply with
the law thus face a bewildering maze of regulations. . .” as even a recording of a professional butcher within
his line of service could violate the law.115 Moreover, the “exception clause” carving out “religious,
political, scientific, educational, journalistic, historical, or artistic” exceptions to the law would not narrow
the scope of the statutory ban as the exceptions required an unrealistically broad reading of the statute in
order to determine which actions fell within the exceptions.116
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United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473 (applying the alternative facial challenge of overbreadth to a law
restricting protected free speech).
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Wash. State. Grange v. Wash. State. Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 (2008).
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Lewis Sargentich, Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970).
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Id. at 464.
112
Id. at 465 - 66.
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Id. at 474.
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Id. at 477-78.
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Ag-Gag laws are severely overbroad as they affect both protected and unprotected speech. As
drafted, Ag-Gag laws restrict individuals from making recordings within animal facilities.117 In North
Dakota, no person, without consent, may enter an animal facility and “use or attempt to use a camera, video
recorder, or any other video or audio recording equipment.”118 Accordingly, it is a violation of this law for
any individual or employee to take a photo of themselves or use a smart phone to call a relative if the phone
has a camera. Taking a photo of oneself and talking on the phone are forms of protected speech; therefore,
this law places in the same class individuals who break and enter into an animal facility and steals equipment
with those who simply facetime a friend with their iPhone 6.
Examples of the laws’ overbreadth do not only exist in hyperbole, either. Amy Meyer’s 2013 arrest
in Utah for photographing animal abuse from a public easement exemplifies how Ag-Gag laws can restrict
both protected speech and unprotected speech.119 While Utah’s Ag-Gag law is not as liberal as North
Dakota’s in that it applies only to trespassers recording with the intent to harm the animal facility, an officer
was still so confused as to its application that it arrested Ms. Meyer for exercising speech that was not
included within the letter of the law.

B. VICTORIES AGAINST AG-GAG LAWS AT THE STATE LEVEL
Even with the litany of defects explained above, Ag-Gag laws have faced little resistance in the
way of legal challenges.120 This is likely because the laws are so rarely enforced by the enacting States.121
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However, as of this writing, three federal challenges have been filed in Utah,122 Wyoming,123 and Idaho,124
with all three cases yielding successful outcomes.125
On July 22, 2013, in response to the Amy Meyer arrest, the Animal Legal Defense Fund (ALDF)
filed the nation’s first civil rights challenge against an Ag-Gag law in the United States District Court for
the District of Utah.126 The complaint challenged Utah’s Ag-Gag law under four causes of action: First
Amendment overbreadth; First Amendment content-based restrictions; preemption; and Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection and due process.127 ALDF argued, in part, that the law chilled Ms. Meyer’s
lawful free speech as she was already arrested for violating Utah’s law while recording on a public
easement.128 After the State moved to dismiss the complaint arguing the lawsuit was filed “for the sole
purpose of challenging the statute,” and not for chilling Ms. Meyer’s speech, Judge Robert Shelby denied
plaintiff’s motion, finding the law indeed underscored a reasonable fear of prosecution, thereby potentially
chilling lawful free speech.129 While this case is still ongoing,130 Judge Shelby’s ruling was a monumental
step toward challenging Ag-Gag laws as it demonstrated an investigator’s standing to bring suit. A trial will
likely occur at the end of 2016.131
On September 29, 2015, a group of environmental and animal activist organizations filed a federal
action challenging the constitutionality of two Wyoming statutes (one criminal and one civil) related to
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preventing the collection and submission of data regarding land and land use of governmental agencies.132
While these Wyoming statutes lack the traditional language found in Ag-Gag laws in a stated purpose to
protect agricultural or animal facilities, the laws nevertheless have the same effect of criminalizing an
investigator’s right to protected free speech in recording animal abuse.133 After the State moved to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claims for lack of standing, improper defendants, and failure to state a claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court denied the motion.134 Regarding plaintiff’s freedom of speech,
freedom to petition under the First Amendment, and equal protection violation arguments raised, the court
had “serious concerns and questions as to the constitutionality of various provisions of these trespass
statutes.”135 While this case is pending, Judge Scott W. Skavdahl expressed concerns of the Wyoming
statute failing to survive even intermediate scrutiny, likely foreshadowing a later decision on the merits of
the case.136
The third action, which ALDF filed on March 17, 2014 against Idaho Governor, C.L. “Butch” Otter
and Idaho Attorney General, Lawrence Wasden in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho,
has yielded the most successful outcome to date.137 The lawsuit challenged Idaho’s Ag-Gag law under the
same causes of action used in its Utah complaint, even borrowing much of the same arguments.138
On August 3, 2015, an order was entered granting ALDF’s motion for summary judgment, thereby
invalidating Idaho’s Ag-Gag law.139 The District Court’s Chief Judge B. Lynn Winmill, entered a thorough
order, invalidating the statute as unconstitutionally impeding protected speech through content-based
audiovisual provisions.140
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In relevant part, Idaho’s Ag-Gag law provides:
A person commits the crime of interference with agricultural production if the
person knowingly:
(a) Is not employed by an agricultural production facility and enters [the] facility
by force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass;
(b) Obtains records of an agricultural production facility by force, threat,
misrepresentation or trespass;
(c) Obtains employment with an agricultural production facility by force, threat, or
misrepresentation with the intent to cause economic or other injury to the facility's
operations . . . [or] business interests . . . ;
(d) Enters an agricultural production facility that is not open to the public and,
without the facility owner's express consent or pursuant to judicial process or
statutory authorization, makes audio or video recordings of the conduct of an
agricultural production facility's operations; or
(e) Intentionally causes physical damage or injury to the agricultural production
facility's operations, livestock, crops, personnel, equipment, buildings or
premises.141
Judge Winmill reasoned that the law was a content-based restriction as it “targets undercover
investigators who intend to publish videos they make through the press and seeks to suppress speech critical
of animal agricultural practices.”142 Attempting to distinguish sections (a)-(c) of their law from Alvarez,143
the State argued the law targets more than just false statement by criminalizing the statement only when
accompanied by the act of recording.144 However, the court noted that Alvarez stands for the proposition
that “the government may criminalize false statements only when those statements, themselves, cause a
‘legally cognizable harm.’”

Idaho has failed to establish the false statements made by undercover

investigators, by themselves, cause any legally cognizable harm.145
Idaho further argued that the law was content-neutral, rather than content-based, because the law
did not regulate speech based on what was said (the message conveyed), but instead where it was said
(within an agricultural facility).146 However, “an employee[] would not violate [this law] if he or she stood
in a[] . . . facility and surreptitiously filmed the . . . owner having a private conversation with his spouse.
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This same employee, however, could be prosecuted under [this law] . . . if the employee, without the owner's
consent, filmed his fellow workers repeatedly beating, kicking, and jumping on cows, or using a moving
tractor to drag a cow on the floor by a chain attached to her neck.”147
Analyzing the law under the strict scrutiny standard, Judge Winmill held the state’s interest in
protecting the personal privacy and private property of the agricultural facility was an important interest,
but not compelling, as food production facilities are within one of the most heavily regulated industries in
our nation and are regularly subjected to state and federal intrusions for the sake of inspection.148 However,
even if the state’s interest is compelling, Idaho’s Ag-Gag law is not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest
as less restrictive means are available.149 “Criminal and civil laws already exist that adequately protect those
interests without impinging on free-speech rights. It is already illegal to steal documents or to trespass on
private property. In addition, laws against fraud and defamation already exist to protect against false
statements made to injure or malign an agricultural production facility.”150 Accordingly, the Idaho law fails
strict scrutiny.151
States confronted with an Ag-Gag law should look toward Judge Winmill’s order as a guide in
analyzing the constitutionality of Ag-Gag laws. The order illustrates how Ag-Gag laws infringe protected
free speech as the laws, implemented primarily by government officials with ties to the agricultural industry,
place a restriction on messages critical of the industry. Further, there is no compelling state interest in
providing increased privacy and property rights to agricultural production facilities. Even if there were, the
laws are not narrowly tailored to achieve that goal as common law protections exist that do not impede
protected speech.
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APPLYING ANTI-SLAPP LEGISLATION

AND

PRINCIPLES

TO

DETER AG-GAG CIVIL

ACTIONS

Aside from being unconstitutional for abridging free speech, there may be other legal mechanisms
available on the legislative horizon to protect lawful protestors against Ag-Gag laws. With most Ag-Gag
laws including provisions allowing increased civil liability if convicted under the law,152 it is possible that
a federal anti-SLAPP law can be used to not only dismiss the facility’s claim, but deter the claims outright
by granting a successful defendant recovery of its litigation costs. This section will discuss the history and
purpose of anti-SLAPP legislation and its applicability to civil actions brought pursuant to Ag-Gag laws.

A. PURPOSE OF ANTI-SLAPP LAWS
The right to petition the government to resolve grievances is a founding principle of the American
democratic system.153 Incorporated into the language of the First Amendment, the framers recognized the
need for the establishment of a fundamental right for citizens to petition the government.154 Laws passed
with the intent to discourage public participation are nothing new and courts are constantly tasked with
determining whether a law unconstitutionally abridges protected fundamental rights.155 Not to be outdone,
industries have sought to achieve the same purpose of those laws being challenged by looking toward the
court system as an alternative to the legislature.156 The acronym “SLAPP” stands for “strategic lawsuits
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right of the people . . . to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”).
155
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against public participation.”157 A SLAPP plaintiff, who generally have far more resources to expend in
litigation than their counterparts, use tort law to punish activists from publicly speaking out against the
plaintiff’s activities to prevent severe economic loss.158 Often brought by businesses, governmental
agencies, and public officials, SLAPP suits are filed for the primary purpose of chilling public participation
that would have a negative effect on the economic interests of the plaintiff.159 SLAPP plaintiffs generally
bring actions for defamation, conspiracy, malicious prosecution, nuisance, and/or tortious interference with
business relationships as a means to turn public participation into an actionable offense.160 Within such
suits, a plaintiff may seek an exorbitant sum in damages, usually well outside the means of the defendant,
and injunctive relief against the petitioning defendant to enjoin continued protest.161
The most disturbing aspect of SLAPP suits is even if the plaintiff is unsuccessful as decided in
court, the plaintiff remains a winner. SLAPP suits are filed not necessarily to be adjudicated on their merits,
but to drain defendants economically and emotionally.162 Because the general rule in civil litigation is barring any contractual or statutory provision - that each party bears its own legal fees,163 insolvent
protesters are at an extreme disadvantage as the corporation would rather spend thousands of dollars in
attorney’s fees to keep the protester busy with litigation than potentially lose millions due to negative
publicity and criticism. Thus, a defendant in a SLAPP action with little resources may cease its otherwise
legal protest against the plaintiff.164 The effectiveness of SLAPP actions lies in the fact that so long as the
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action states a claim of relief that is “plausible on its face,” it should survive a motion to dismiss.165
Regardless of whether a defendant has factual defenses to plaintiff’s claims, a complaint pled with sufficient
particularity will generally allow a plaintiff to proceed with propounding discovery onto a defendant.166
SLAPP actions are internationally employed, prevalent in courts within United States, Canada, Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Philippines.167
Recognizing the need to even the playing field, California was the first state in the U.S. to enact an
anti-SLAPP law in 1993.168 Taking a strong stance against SLAPP suits, the California legislature found “a
disturbing increase in lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of
freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances . . . [and] declare[d] that it is in the public
interest to encourage continued participation in matters of public significance.”169 After 1993, the majority
of the country followed with thirty-two states and territories (Washington, D.C. and Guam) now providing
some sort of anti-SLAPP protection through statutes and common law.170
Anti-SLAPP laws are creatures of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which follows the principle that
every United States citizen has the right to participate in the governmental process and should not be
punished for exercising that right.171 These statutes generally provide defendants with a special motion to
strike or motion to dismiss that can rapidly end litigation.172 For example, in California, their anti-SLAPP
statute grants a judge authority to, at the outset of a suit, determine whether the lawsuit has the “probability”
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of winning.173 If the judge finds it does not, the lawsuit must be dismissed and the defendant is entitled to
recovery of its attorney fees.174 Similar to whistleblower statutes that protect citizens from liability and
encourage them to report violations of the law,175 anti-SLAPP motions protect citizens from being dragged
through frivolous litigation and encourage them to continue to participate in public discussion over illegal
or inhumane practices by industries.
Generally, a defendant may file an anti-SLAPP motion if the cause of action pled against them
arises from the defendant’s public participation in connection with a public issue.176 However, some states
limit the applicability of anti-SLAPP motions through restrictions on the method in which the speech
occurred or the topic the speech it aimed to criticize.177

B. APPLYING ANTI-SLAPP LAWS AND PRINCIPLES TO DETER AND DISPOSE OF LAWSUITS BROUGHT
UNDER AG-GAG CIVIL LIABILITY PROVISIONS
Ideally, anti-SLAPP laws would expand to cover the dismissal of criminal actions brought against
individuals exercising their constitutional right to free speech and petition their government; however,
current legislation only applied to civil actions. Consequently, an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss would, at
best, protect an undercover animal investigator against the increased civil penalties included in Ag-Gag
laws, but not against potential jail time or fines. Ag-Gag laws are inconsistent with the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, as these laws are in place for the express purpose of stopping undercover investigators from
publicizing inhumanities, which does not allow an individual to thoroughly participate in the petitioning of
government for change. Accordingly, in order to protect a citizen’s constitutional right to petition, the same
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principles behind state anti-SLAPP laws should be applied across the judicial spectrum in both criminal
and civil instances.
Currently, in order to apply an anti-SLAPP law to an Ag-Gag law, the latter must contain a
provision that holds a violator civilly liable for damages.178 Not surprising, of the seven states with codified
Ag-Gag statutes, only two, Utah and Missouri, have anti-SLAPP statutes in place.179 Moreover, Utah and
Missouri’s Ag-Gag laws do not include a civil liability provision,180 thereby making its anti-SLAPP law
inapplicable. With the remaining five states, each of which includes a civil penalty provision in their AgGag laws, an anti-SLAPP law would be effective in limiting an agricultural facility’s ability to silence an
undercover investigator.
This is where the SPEAK FREE Act of 2015 can help.181 A new bipartisan house bill introduced
on May 13, 2015, the “Securing Participation, Engagement, and Knowledge Freedom by Reducing
Egregious Efforts” (“SPEAK FREE”) Act is a federal anti-SLAPP law that creates a special motion to
dismiss SLAPP suits.182 In filing the motion, a defendant must make a “prima facie showing that the claim
at issue arises from an oral or written statement or other expression by the defendant that was made in
connection with an official proceeding or about a matter of public concern.”183 Matters of public concern
under the proposed legislation is defined expansively to include: (1) health or safety; (2) environmental,
economic, or community well-being; (3) the government; (4) a public official or public figure; or (5) a
good, product, or service in the marketplace.184 The law allows a judge to consider the merits of pleadings
at an early stage, similar to a motion for summary judgment.185 If a defendant successfully establishes the
above-mentioned prima facie showing and the plaintiff cannot demonstrate that their claim is likely to
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succeed on its merits, the complaint will be dismissed with prejudice and the court may require plaintiff to
pay defendant’s litigation fees.186
Applying the SPEAK FREE Act to civil actions brought by Ag-Gag violations, a defendant would
be able to apply the proposed federal legislation not only to dismiss a plaintiff’s claim at an early stage of
litigation, but require the plaintiff to pay all of defendant’s litigation costs. Without this act, current
defendants of Ag-Gag lawsuits, assuming the complaint was pled with sufficient particularity, would be
forced to incur thousands of dollars in litigation cost to adjudicate these claims. Moreover, even if they are
successful, the defendant is likely not entitled to recover fees.
With “matters of public concern” being broadly defined within the SPEAK FREE Act, it will
protect undercover investigators who film inhumanities within an animal facility for the purpose of
publication as the recordings should be considered a matter of health, safety, environmental harm, and/or
an issue related with a good or product in the marketplace. While this is an imperfect solution to Ag-Gag
laws as the proposed legislation does not cover criminal actions, it at least would provide protection from
a portion of those laws. Furthermore, because this is a federal law, these protections will be in place for
citizens of every state if any future Ag-Gag laws were to be enacted. As of this writing, the SPEAK FREE
Act has been referred to two subcommittees and awaits committee vote.187 There is optimism that this act
will pass as it is the first of its kind to be introduced with bi-partisan co-sponsors.188
Alternatively, defendants in a state without an anti-SLAPP statute who are faced with a civil action
brought under Ag-Gag may turn to common law to create a pseudo anti-SLAPP statute. In Protect Our
Mountain Environment, Inc. v. District Court In and For Jefferson County,189 Protect Our Mountain
Environment, Inc. (POME) brought a thirteen-count civil action against Gayno, Inc. in Colorado190
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challenging the approval of its residential construction application.191 After the district court ruled against
POME (and the appellate court affirmed the ruling), Gayno filed an action against POME alleging that
POME, “knowing its claims were without legal justification, had abused the legal process and caused Gayno
economic harm . . . by unreasonably delaying the filing of the administrative record.”192 In response to
POME’s argument that its original complaint was a lawful exercise of its First Amendment right to petition
the government for redress of grievances, the district court ruled in favor of Gayno, holding that POME’s
complaint was a “sham” pleading.193
The Supreme Court of Colorado used this issue to create a process similar to anti-SLAPP statutes
when balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to petition the court for grievances and a party’s
right to be free from baseless litigation.194 The court held its new “standard will safeguard the constitutional
right of citizens to utilize the administrative and judicial processes for redress of legal grievances without
fear of retaliatory litigation and, at the same time, will permit those truly aggrieved by abuse of these
processes to vindicate their own legal rights.”195 Similar principles were followed in West Virginia with its
highest court applying an actual malice requirement to parties seeking redress from citizens exercising their
fundamental right to petition the government.196
Citizens faced with a civil lawsuit brought under an Ag-Gag law can argue the application of the
two cases cited above as support for why a court should dismiss a retaliatory action to the exercise of a First
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Amendment right. Although both cases deal with the fundamental right to petition the government for
redress, the fundamental right of free speech falls within the same constitutional amendment and follows
similar purposes and principles.197 The highest courts of Colorado and West Virginia have recognized the
need to protect their citizens’ exercise of a fundamental right from a lawsuit intended to chill that exercise.
By requiring the plaintiff, upon a motion to dismiss, to “make a sufficient showing to permit the court to
reasonably conclude that the defendant's petitioning activities were not immunized from liability under the
First Amendment,” the fundamental right to petition the government is protected.198 That same logic should
be applied to Ag-Gag laws where a citizen is facing a civil action resulting from his or her exercise of their
fundamental right of free speech. Requiring a plaintiff to show that the defendant’s exercise of speech was
not immunized from liability under the First Amendment will have the same effect as an anti-SLAPP law
as it will allow the court to adjudicate the lawsuit on its merits at an early stage, potentially saving a
defendant thousands in litigation costs.

CONCLUSION

Over a century after Upton Sinclair’s undercover investigative expedition sparked federal reform
of the meat packing industry, laws today have somehow devolved into protections against the very acts that
exposed the public to potential health and animal welfare concerns. Agricultural industry “gag orders”
have been codified in seven (soon to be eight) states for the primary purpose of impeding an undercover
investigator’s ability to gain entry into an animal facility and document evidence of the abusive, inhumane,
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and/or unsanitary treatment of animals. These laws go against the very foundation of the First Amendment
of the United States Constitution as they impede a specific type of speech: that detrimental to the
agricultural industry.
As content-based restrictions on protected free speech, Ag-Gag laws nationwide should be found
to be unconstitutional as they do not further a compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive
means possible. Tort law is readily available to animal facilities who believe they have a valid claim against
an undercover investigator and, therefore, an Ag-Gag law should not be in place where it provides those
same protections while simultaneously abridging a protected class of speech. Furthermore, Ag-Gag laws
are unconstitutionally overbroad as they may be applicable to multiple forms of protected speech, even ones
that the drafters of the laws did not intend to impede.
Looking to the environmental law context may help combat Ag-Gag laws by applying anti-SLAPP
legislation and jurisprudence to the civil liability provisions with Ag-Gag laws. Applying an anti-SLAPP
statute or its principles to an Ag-Gag law should allow an animal investigator to quickly resolve a frivolous
lawsuit meant to chill their participation in criticizing an animal facility. This is, however, an imperfect
solution as it will only address the civil side of Ag-Gag laws and not the more prominent criminal side.
Overall, the purpose of this article is not to advocate that animal facilities should not enjoy personal and
private property rights against those seeking to violate such rights, but rather as a reminder that laws
providing additional legal protections akin to protections already in place are unconstitutional when they
abridge a protected form of free speech.
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